LD III, LLC v. BBRD, L.C. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2008
LD III, LLC v. BBRD, L.C. : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael N. Zundel; James A. Boevers; Prince, Yeates & Geldzahler; Attorneys for Defenders-
Appellees BBRD, L.C., Richard W. Davis, and BBRD, Inc..
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.; Steven R. Paul; Daniel B. Garriott; Nelson, Snuffer, Dahle & Poulson, P.C.;
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant LD III, LLC.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, LD III, LLC v. BBRD, L.C., No. 20080839 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2008).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/1218
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
---ooo0ooo---
LD III, LLC, a Utah limited liability
company 
Plaintiff,
  
vs.
BBRD, L.C., a Utah limited liability
company, RICHARD W. DAVIS, an
individual; MOUNTAIN WEST TITLE
COMPANY; and BBRD, INC, an alter
ego of Defendant Richard W. Davis,
Defendants.
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
Utah Supreme Court No. 20080839
District Court Civil No. 080400318
PRIORITY NO.: 15
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPELLANT LD III, LLC'S
OPENING BRIEF ON APPEAL
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Appeal from the Order of the Fourth District Court,
Utah County, Provo Division, The Honorable Judge Fred Howard
Michael N. Zundel (3755)
James A. Boevers (0371)
Richard H. Thornton (3253)
PRINCE, YEATES & GEDZAHLER
175 East 400 South, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 524-1000
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellees
BBRD, L.C., Richard W. Davis, and
BBRD, Inc.
Denver C. Snuffer , Jr.(3032)
Steven R. Paul (7423)
Daniel B. Garriott (9444)
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE 
& POULSEN, P.C.
10885 South State 
Sandy, UT 84070
Telephone: (801) 576-1400
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant LD III,
LLC
* ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
Appellant, LD III, LLC, submits this brief in the appeal before this Court.
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW
The Plaintiff-Appellant:
LD III, LLC, a Utah limited liability company.
The Defendants-Appellees:
BBRD, L.C., a Utah limited liability company, RICHARD W.
DAVIS, an individual; MOUNTAIN WEST TITLE
COMPANY; and BBRD, INC, an alter ego of Defendant
Richard W. Davis.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING BELOW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STANDARD OF REVIEW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
RULES AND REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO APPEAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Nature of the Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Facts established in the District Court Record . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
I. The Alleged Settlement Agreement Is Not Enforceable Because There Was
No Meeting of the Minds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
II. Counteroffer Constitutes Rejection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
A. Assignment Not Valid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
B. The Counteroffer Creates Unfavorable Tax Implications . . . . . . . 19
CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
iv
ADDENDUM TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
vTABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Court Cases and Other Authorities
B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst, 503 P.2d 1216 (Utah 1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Brighton Corp. v. Ward, 31 P.3d 594 (Utah Ct. App. 2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d 597 (Utah 1962) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372 (Utah 1995) . . . . . . . 13, 17
Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1978) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,324 U.S. 331 (1945) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Cove View Excavating & Constr. Co. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) . . . 12
Crismon v. Western Co. of North America, 742 P.2d 1219 (Utah App. 1987) . . . . . . . . 12
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Sys., Inc., 866 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1993) . . . . . . . 2, 12
Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S. 355 (1939) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636 (Utah 1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Homestead Golf Club v. Pride Stables, 224 F.3d 1195 (10th Cir. 2000) . . . . . . 14, 15, 16
In Re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885 (Utah 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dietlin, 199 A.2d 311, 313 (R.I. 1964) . . . . . . . . . . 17
Lawrence Constr. Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382 (Utah 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co. v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293 (Utah 1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677 (Utah App. 1989), aff'd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990) 2
vi
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938 (Utah 1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573 (Utah App. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 989 P.2d 1077 (Ut. Ct. App. 1999) . . . . . . . . . . 17
O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 1289 (Utah 1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Oberhansley v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384 (Utah 1977) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13
Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193 (Utah 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
R.J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 247 P.2d 817 (1952) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13, 16, 17
Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217 (Utah 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
United States v. Leslie Mower, U.S. District Court for the District of Utah, Case No.
2:02-CR-00787 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Valcarce v. Bitter, 362 P.2d 427 (Utah 1961) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Wadsworth Const. v. City of St. George, 865 P.2d 1373 (Utah App. 1993) . . . . . . . . 2, 17
Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 
781 P.2d 478 (Utah App. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Constitutions, Statutes, and Regulations
26 U.S.C. § 1012 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j), . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3, 11, 15
vii
Other Sources
55 Am. Jur. 508, § 39 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Restatement 2  of Contracts, Section, 317(2) (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .nd 18
 Utah Const., Article VIII, § 5.1
 Ut. Code Ann., § 78-2-2(3)(j) (1953, as amended).2
1
JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT
The jurisdiction of all appellate courts "shall be provided by statute."   Section 78-2-1
2(3)(j) of the Utah Code, provides that: "The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction…,
over orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals
does not have original appellate jurisdiction[.]"   This is an appeal from the final judgment2
of the Fourth District Court in a civil matter, and although it has original appellate
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has transferred this matter to the Court of Appeals pursuant
to § 78-2-2(4) and § 78-2a-3(2)(j), which provide that the Supreme Court may transfer any
matter over which it has original appellate jurisdiction.
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Whether the District Court erred by determining an enforceable settlement
agreement had been reached between the parties when the parties never agreed on all the
material terms of settlement and a writing acceptable to the parties was never agreed upon,
prepared or executed by the parties.
2STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The issue of whether a contract exists may present both questions of law and fact,
depending on the nature of the claims raised."  Wadsworth Const. v. City of St. George, 865
P.2d 1373, 1375 (Utah App. 1993); see O'Hara v. Hall, 628 P.2d 1289, 1290-91 (Utah 1981)
(existence of a contract is generally a conclusion of law, unless there is a material dispute of
fact, which presents a subsidiary question of fact).  "Factual findings made by the trial court
will be upheld unless they are clearly erroneous."    Mostrong v. Jackson, 866 P.2d 573, 577
(Utah App. 1993) (citing In Re Estate of Bartell, 776 P.2d 885, 886 (Utah 1989)).  "Legal
conclusions are reviewed for correction of error."  Mostrong, 866 P.2d at 577 (citing
Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677, 680 (Utah App. 1989), aff'd, 788 P.2d 520 (Utah
1990)).  
RULES AND REGULATIONS APPLICABLE TO APPEAL
None.
3It is important to note that BBRD, Inc. does not exist and has never existed as a registered corporate
entity.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case:
The Statute of Frauds  requires any agreement for the sale or purchase of real property
to be in writing to be enforceable.  See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1.  Plaintiff LD III, LLC ("LD
III") is the owner of real property located in Utah County.  See Court Record, the "Rec." pp.
17-15, ¶ 3.  In August of 2007, Defendant Davis made an offer to purchase the real property
from LD III.  Rec. 370-366.  The offer was set out in a standard form Real Estate Purchase
Contract for Land ( the "REPC").  The buyer was listed on the REPC as BBRD, Inc.  and/or3
Richard Davis (collectively "Davis").  The REPC contained all the terms of the sale,
including performance dates, that "time was of the essence" and others.  Id.  LD III accepted
the offer contained in the REPC.  Id.   Thereafter Davis failed to close the purchase by the
deadline contained in the REPC.   Therefore the REPC lapsed.   Rec.  14-1.  
Notwithstanding Davis'  failure to perform,  he recorded a "Notice of Interest" in the
records of the Utah County Recorder.   Rec.  69-68.   LD III filed this action to have the lien
removed.   Rec.  14-1.   During an expedited discovery process,  the parties began settlement
discussions.   The parties discussed settling the matter on terms modeled after the REPC,
but with adjusted closing dates and other terms to be offered by Davis and approved by LD
III.   Davis agreed to prepare the settlement documents for review and approval by LD III,
4including a settlement agreement containing all of the specific terms of settlement and
closing documents which the parties would sign to resolve the matter and create an
enforceable contract to transfer the property.   New closing dates were not discussed,  but
were to be included in the written settlement documents.
Davis did not prepare a settlement agreement.   Instead,  Davis provided LD III with
closing documents which contained new terms to which LD III had never agreed.   The
closing documents Davis prepared constituted a very different offer for settlement than had
been discussed,  contained terms the parties had never discussed and did not contain
material terms,  including new dates for performance.   See Rec.  328-307.  The new and
different settlement offer contained terms which were unacceptable and never agreed to by
LD III.   Davis'  new offer to settle involved new parties and would have created
unacceptable risks for LD III and its sole member because it constituted a scheme by Davis
to evade income taxes.   Id.   LD III rejected this offer to settle.   Rec.  372 (see email from
Daniel B.  Garriott to Michael Zundel dated August 20,  2008).   When LD III refused to
accept the terms offered as contained in the closing documents Davis prepared,  Davis
moved the District Court to enforce what he has argued to be an enforceable contract.
Rec.  257-255.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below:
Defendants filed a Motion to Enforce Settlement Agreement, which was fully briefed
by each party.  Rec. 423-255.  The motion was argued before Judge Fred D. Howard of the
5Fourth Judicial District Court on September 17, 2008.  Rec. 365.  The Court requested post-
hearing briefs, which were filed on September 19, 2008.  Rec. 423-364.  On September 23,
2008, the Court held a short telephone conference with the parties' counsel, in which it
granted Defendants' Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement.  Rec. 416.  The Court
entered an Order granting Defendant's Motion to Enforce the Settlement Agreement.  Rec.
453-450 (a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix Exhibit 1).  LD III timely appealed
the District Court's decision.  Rec. 432.
Facts established in the District Court Record:
1. LD III owns of certain real property and water rights located in Utah County.
Rec. 17-15.
2. On August 29, 2007, Davis offered to purchase the real property and water
rights.  Rec. 370-366 (a copy of the REPC is attached hereto as Appendix Exhibit 2.)  
3. The REPC required Davis to pay $1,500,000.00 for the real property and water
rights, with $10,000.00 as an earnest money deposit and the remaining $1,490,000.00 to be
paid in cash at closing.  Id.
4. The deadline for closing was September 28, 2007.  Id. at ¶24(c).
5. Davis failed to close and pay the balance of the purchase price prior to the
closing date of September 28, 2007.  Rec. 14-1.
6. On December 26, 2007, Davis recorded a "Notice of Interest" against the real
property.  Rec. 69-68.
67. On February 1, 2008, LD III initiated this action to remove the lien.  Rec. 14-1.
8. On July 9, 2008, LD III's counsel, Denver Snuffer, participated in a telephone
conference with Davis' counsel, Michael Zundel and Jim Boevers.  See Rec. 288-283 (the
Affidavit of Defendant's counsel, Michael Zundel (hereinafter "Zundel Aff.", ¶ 6); see also,
Rec. 306-304 (the Affidavit of Defendant's counsel James A. Boevers (hereinafter "Boevers
Aff."), ¶ 31.
9. During the  telephone conference, Mr. Zundel asked Mr. Snuffer if LD III
would be willing to settle the matter on terms modeled after the REPC. See Rec. 288-283
(Zundel Aff.) ¶7 and Rec. 272, Ex. E to Zundel Aff.; see also Rec. 306-304 (Boevers Aff.),
¶4 and Rec. 301-297 (Ex. A  thereto.)  Mr. Snuffer replied that he could not respond until
after he had conferred with his client.  Several days later, having conferred with LD III, Mr.
Snuffer communicated to Mr. Zundel that LD III was willing to consider settlement terms
similar to the terms contained in the REPC.  See Rec. 693, pp. 19:9-25; 20; 21:1-13.
10. However, both parties knew that a settlement agreement would have to be in
writing to be enforceable and that addition terms would need to be agreed to by both parties.
Davis' counsel agreed to draw up settlement documents which would include all the material
terms settlement so Mr. Snuffer could present them to and discuss them with LD III.  Rec.
288-283 (Zundel Aff.), ¶9.  
711. The parties had not agreed on critical, material terms of settlement including
closing dates and allocation issues, as the sale included the sale of both real property and
water rights.  See Rec. 693, pp. 23:18-25; 24:1-13.
12. On July 28, 2008, almost three weeks after the telephone conference between
the parties' counsel, Davis' counsel, Mr. Richard H. Thornton, sent an e-mail to Mr. Snuffer,
attaching drafts of closing documents Mr. Thornton had prepared.  Id. at ¶¶ 9-10; see also
Rec. 328-307 (copy of closing documents prepared and sent by Mr. Thornton).
13. The closing documents attached to the July 28, 2008 email did not include a
settlement agreement document. See Rec. 328-307.  Further, the closing documents
contained material terms to which LD III had not agreed and that were not in conformity with
the parties' settlement discussions.  Id.  The documents provided by Davis' counsel therefore
constituted a counteroffer.  (These documents shall be referred to as the "Counteroffer".)  See
Rec. 328-307 (Counteroffer), Rec. 301-297 (REPC).  Among other things, instead of selling
the real property and water rights to Davis, the Counteroffer requires LD III to sell the real
property and water rights to five separate parties/entities.  Rec. 328-307.
14. The Counteroffer required LD III to transfer the real property and water rights,
not just to Davis, but to: (a) Stephen Sandstrom and Jennifer Sandstrom; (b) SWLRD, LLC
a/k/a SWRD, LLC; (c) PBRD, LLC; (d) Richard W. Davis and Beverly B. Davis, trustees
of the R.W. David Family Protection Trust dated the 4  day of December 2000; and (e)th
BBRD, L.C.  The Counteroffer implicates LD III and its sole member in a tax evasion
The tables in footnotes 5 and 6 demonstrate the difference in the nature of the transaction4
between the REPC (Rec. 370-66) and the Counterofffer (Rec. 328-07).
REPC5
Seller Buyer Proposed Owner Acres of Property
to be Purchased
Shares of Water to
be Purchased
LD III, LLC BBRD, Inc. and/or
Richard W. Davis
BBRD, Inc. and/or
Richard W. Davis
70.81 25.93
COUNTEROFFER6
Seller Buyer Proposed Owner Acres of Property
to be Purchased
Shares of Water to
be Purchased
LD III, LLC BBRD, Inc. and/or
Richard W. Davis
Stephen and Jennifer
Sandstrom
7.496 2.0
SWLRD, LLC a/k/a
SWRD, LLC
7.506 2.0
PBRD, LLC 7.500 2.0
Richard W. Davis and
Beverly B. Davis,
trustees of the R.W.
Davis Family Protection
Trust dated the 4  day ofth
December 2000
10.500 2.0
BBRD, LC 37.808 21.93
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scheme.     Id.  (see also Appendix Exhibit 3.)  The Settlement Statement prepared by Davis4 5 6
shows that Davis is the buyer of the real property and water rights.  However, Davis did not
receive title to any ownership rights under the terms of the Counteroffer.  Id.  The
Counteroffer allows Davis to "pay" for the property, divide it into six parcels, transfer five
parcels to other parties (these other five parties would pay for the entire purchase), and retain
9one parcel worth $300,000.00 without Davis recognizing any taxable gain on the sale of the
five parcels.  See Rec. 699, p. 11:3-12, 15:8-12.  
15.      Leslie D. Mower, the sole member of LD III, has been previously convicted
of conspiracy to commit tax evasion.  (See United States v. Leslie Mower, U.S. District Court
for the District of Utah, Case No. 2:02-CR-00787.)
16.       Because the Counteroffer constituted a scheme by Davis to evade paying
income tax on the sale of the five parcels, Ms. Mower and her tax advisors determined the
Counteroffer would implicate her in a tax evasion scheme and therefore could not be
accepted.  Rec. 395-390.
17. On August 20, 2008, LD III, rejected the Counteroffer.  Rec. 372, see also
Appendix Exhibit 4.
18.      There never was a settlement agreement reached in this matter.  Id.  LD III is
unwilling to deal with Davis regarding the real property because of his attempt to implicate
LD III and its sole member in a scheme to evade income taxes.   Rec. 395-390.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
This case concerns the failed sale of real property and water rights, and the recording
of a wrongful lien.  The parties discussed settlement terms modeled after the REPC, but had
yet to agree to all material terms of settlement.  After discussions between counsel, Davis
agreed to prepare settlement documents containing the specific terms of Davis' settlement
offer.  However, he did not do this.  The documents which Davis prepared contained
10
different settlement terms than had been discussed by the parties and imposed risks and
burdens to LD III that were unacceptable.  Therefore LD III rejected the Counteroffer,
leaving the parties without any settlement agreement.
Every contract requires a "meeting of the minds."  In this case, there was no meeting
of the minds.  This is evident by comparing the REPC and the Counteroffer.  LD III expected
Davis to prepare a settlement agreement modeled after the terms in the REPC.  However, the
Counteroffer did not do that, rather it contained materially different terms.  The District
Court's decision to find an enforceable settlement "agreement" was in error because there was
no meeting of the minds, or alternatively because the Counteroffer constituted a rejection of
the settlement terms discussed by the parties and was rejected by LD III.  There was no
agreement.
Furthermore, the Counteroffer presumes an assignment of Davis' interest to new and
different parties who were strangers to the REPC.  Davis previously argued that such an
assignment was valid and acceptable.  That, however, is not the case.  There was no
provision in the REPC, on which the parties' settlement was modeled, allowing for
assignment.  The Counteroffer created additional risks and burdens upon LD III that are
unacceptable.  It was of serious consequence to LD III that Davis attempted to make the
attempted assignment.  As such, there is no agreement between the parties and the District
Court's decision was in error and should be reversed.
11
ARGUMENT
The parties discussed settlement and Defendants were to prepare a writing
memorializing a proposed form for agreement, as required not only by the parties'
discussions, but also by the Utah Statute of Frauds.  See Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1998).
There could be no settlement without a writing in this case, and the parties believed there
remained material terms left to be discussed, including specific dates of performance.  The
documents which were prepared, however, did not reflect the transaction described in the
REPC, did not involve the same parties as the REPC, nor did they contain all material terms
necessary to complete the transaction.  
These documents, which are referred to herein as the "Counteroffer," contemplate not
one transaction between one buyer and one seller, as discussed, but involve multiple buyers
(who were to pay for the entirety of the transaction (see Rec. 699, p. 11:3-12, 15:8-12)) in
multiple transactions.  The Counteroffer is constructed in an apparent attempt to avoid the
payment of taxes by Davis for $300,000 in profits made on the resale of the property by
Davis to his buyers.  In effect, the transaction written up by Davis removes him as the buyer
and re-seller to the third parties, and instead makes the transaction a direct sale between LD
III and these third parties, but gifts to Davis a portion of the property worth at least 25% of
the purchase price, free and clear, without any cost to him.  The tax implications of this new
and very different transaction are significant and create unacceptable risks and burdens to the
LD III, which it was entitled to reject.  Essentially Davis was asking LD III to agree to join
12
him in concealing $300,000 in taxable gain.  Given the foregoing, it was error for the District
Court to find an enforceable settlement agreement.
I. The Alleged Settlement Agreement Is Not Enforceable Because There
Was No Meeting of the Minds.
"It is a basic rule that the law favors the settlement of disputes.  Such
agreements under the proper circumstances may be summarily enforced.
However, whether a court should enforce such an agreement does not turn
merely on the character of the agreement.  An agreement of compromise and
settlement constitutes an executory accord.  Since an executory accord
'constitutes a valid enforceable contract,' basic contract principles affect the
determination of when a settlement agreement should be so enforced."  
Goodmansen v. Liberty Vending Sys., Inc., 866 P.2d 581, 584 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting
Mascaro v. Davis, 741 P.2d 938, 942 (Utah 1987) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)
(quoting Lawrence Constr. Co. v. Holmquist, 642 P.2d 382, 384 (Utah 1982))); accord Zions
First Nat'l Bank v. Barbara Jensen Interiors, Inc., 781 P.2d 478, 479 (Utah App. 1989).  For
a settlement agreement to be enforced, the basic contract law requirements - offer,
acceptance, consideration, and a meeting of the minds - are necessary for a valid agreement
to exist.  See Peirce v. Peirce, 994 P.2d 193, 199 (Utah 2000); Cove View Excavating &
Constr. Co. v. Flynn, 758 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); see also Oberhansley v. Earle,
572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977) (stating "[i]t is a basic principle of contract law there can
be no contract without a meeting of the minds of the parties.")  
In Crismon v. Western Co. of North America, 742 P.2d 1219 (Utah App. 1987), the
Utah Court of Appeals stated that "contractual mutual assent requires assent by all parties to
the same thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms."  Id. at 1221;
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see also Sackler v. Savin, 897 P.2d 1217, 1220-22 (Utah 1995) (holding that to form an
enforceable settlement agreement, there must be a meeting of the minds).  Determining
whether the specific terms omitted were essential to the agreement requires an examination
of the entire agreement and the circumstances under which the agreement was entered into.
Id. at 1221-22 (quoting Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978)).  "If
there was evidence from which it would be reasonable to find that there was [no] meeting
of the minds, the decision [decided as a matter of law] cannot be sustained."  R.J. Daum
Constr. Co. v. Child, 122 Utah 194, 196-97, 247 P.2d 817, 818 (1952).  In this instance, it
is evident there was no meeting of the minds, and therefore it was error for the District Court
to find there to be an enforceable agreement.
Under Utah law, the party claiming the existence of a contract has the burden to prove
"there has been mutual assent by the parties manifesting their intention to be bound by its
terms."  Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376 (Utah 1995); see
also Oberhansley v. Earle, 572 P.2d 1384, 1386 (Utah 1977) (citing B & R Supply Co. v.
Bringhurst, 503 P.2d 1216, 1217 (Utah 1972)).  "Contractual mutual assent requires assent
by all parties to the same thing in the same sense so that their minds meet as to all the terms."
Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P.2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 1978).    
"[A] contract can be enforced by the courts only if the obligations of the parties are
set forth with sufficient definiteness that it can be performed."  Bunnell v. Bills, 368 P.2d
597, 600 (Utah 1962), overruled in part on other grounds by Leigh Furniture & Carpet Co.
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v. Isom, 657 P.2d 293, 302-04 (Utah 1982).  "If 'there was simply some nebulous notion in
the air that a contract might be entered into in the future, the court cannot fabricate the kind
of contract the parties ought to have made and enforce it.'"  Homestead Golf Club v. Pride
Stables, 224 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting Valcarce v. Bitter, 362 P.2d 427,
428-29 (Utah 1961)).  
In Homestead Golf Club, the parties disputed whether an oral settlement agreement
was an enforceable contract.  Id. at 1199.  The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that no
enforceable settlement agreement existed because essential terms were missing, namely the
funding date of the loan, the interest rate, and the payment schedule.  Id. at 1200-01.
Specifically, the Homestead court ruled the parties merely entered into an "agreement to
agree" because essential material terms were missing, thereby preventing an enforceable
agreement.  Id.  Citing Harmon v. Greenwood, 596 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1979), the
Homestead court found an agreement to agree is "'unenforceable because [it] leave[s] open
material terms for future consideration, and the courts cannot create these terms for the
parties.'"  Homestead Golf Club, 224 F.3d at 1200-01.
Homestead Golf Club is directly applicable to this case.  Here, LD III and Davis did
not enter into an enforceable settlement agreement.  The parties discussed a settlement
modeled after the terms contained in the REPC.  However, material terms were not agreed
upon.  LD III and Davis did not come to any agreement on the dates of performance,
including when the transaction would commence and close, when the loan would be funded,
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when the money would exchange hands, and when title to the property would exchange
hands, or how to apportion the sale price between real property and water rights.  There was
no meeting of the minds regarding the terms of a settlement agreement.  Settlement remained
entirely contingent upon the acceptance by LD III of the terms contained in a writing that was
to be prepared by Davis.  Any agreement had to be written to be enforceable for several
reasons, including the requirements of the Statute of Frauds. 
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 states:
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding
one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any
manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered or
declared otherwise than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance
in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering
or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.
This statute requires any agreement transferring real property to be in writing in order
to be enforceable. No enforceable agreement could have been achieved in this matter without
its terms being reduced to a writing that the parties signed.  In this case, the writing
(Counteroffer) created was materially different from the terms discussed by the parties and
was never agreed to nor signed by LD III.
Furthermore, the purchasers in the Counteroffer did not even include Davis.  In the
REPC, the only purchaser/buyer is Davis.  However, the Counteroffer contains warranty
deeds transferring the real property in separate parcels to five different purchasers/buyers.
These purchasers/buyers included: (a) Stephen Sandstrom and Jennifer Sandstrom; (b)
SWLRD, LLC, also known as SWRD, LLC; (c) PBRD, LLC; (d) Richard W. Davis and
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Beverly B. Davis, as trustees of The R.W. Davis Family Protection Trust dated the 4  dayth
of December 2000; and (e) BBRD, L.C.  (Rec. 337-22, Thornton Affidavit, Exhibit B.)
These additional purchasers/buyers were never discussed with LD III nor contemplated by
LD III to be parties to any agreement to settle this matter.  LD III never agreed to sell the
property to any other person or entity than Davis. 
LD III and Davis did not enter into a settlement agreement.  At best, they merely
entered into an agreement to agree, which cannot be enforced.  Homestead Golf Club, supra.
Therefore, the District Court should be reversed. 
II. Counteroffer Constitutes Rejection.
In this case, the District Court erroneously found the parties had settled this dispute.
The District Court incorrectly determined the parties agreed to be bound by the terms of the
REPC, and then judicially created and enforced terms that had never previously existed.  The
District Court's incorrect finding was made without the benefit of an actual writing
containing the parties' agreement.  Even assuming arguendo that LD III verbally agreed to
be bound by the terms of the REPC, Davis' written Counteroffer (the Closing Documents)
rescinded his offer, constituted a new offer (which was never accepted by LD III), and
evidenced his intent not to be bound by the verbal agreement.  This rejection eliminates
Davis' ability to enforce any agreement.  
"To create a binding contract the acceptance must unconditionally agree to all the
material provisions of the offer, and must not add any new material conditions."  R.J. Daum
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Const. Co. v. Child, et al., 122 Utah 194, 202 (1952) (citations omitted).  "A reply to an offer,
though purporting to accept it, which adds qualifications or requires performance of
conditions, is not an acceptance but is a counter-offer."  Wadsworth Const. v. City of St.
George, 865 P.2d 1373, 1376 (Utah App. 1993) (citing R.J. Daum Constr. Co., 247 P.2d at
821).  "An acceptance which is equivocal or upon condition or with a limitation is a
counteroffer and requires acceptance by the original offeror before a contractual relationship
can exist."  John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Dietlin, 199 A.2d 311, 313 (R.I. 1964).  Also,
"[i]f the optionee attaches conditions not warranted by the terms of the option to his
acceptance … this itself amounts to a rejection."  55 Am. Jur. 508, § 39.  "An offeree's
proposal of different terms from those of the offer constitutes a counteroffer, and no contract
arises unless the original offeror accepts it unconditionally."  Cal Wadsworth Constr., 898
P.2d at 1378.  If material terms are altered, the altered form becomes a counteroffer and
therefore a rejection of the original offer.  See Nunley v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 1999
UT 100, ¶ 27, 989 P.2d 1077 ("'An acceptance must unconditionally assent to all material
terms presented in the offer, including price and method of performance, or it is a rejection
of the offer.'") (quoting Cal Wadsworth Constr. v. City of St. George, 898 P.2d 1372, 1376
(Utah 1995)). 
The REPC, which the District Court held was to be followed "exactly," indicates who
the parties to the transaction were intended to be.  Davis was the offeror.  (See Appendix
Exhibit 2.)  There were no other potential offerors.  The REPC has no language permitting
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assignment.  Nevertheless, the written closing documents required LD III to deed its real
property and water rights to five totally different buyers, none of whom are parties to the
REPC.  Their substitution created a much different transaction than that contained within the
terms of the REPC.  This constitutes a rejection of the original agreement and counteroffer
by Davis.  
This new transaction constituted a scheme by Davis to evade paying income taxes on
the resale of portions of the real property and water rights.  Ms. Mower (the sole member of
LD III) and her tax advisors were concerned that the transaction would involve her in a
conspiracy to evade paying income taxes.  The Counteroffer invited LD III to join in this tax
evasion scheme- an opportunity LD III rejected.
A. Assignment Not Valid.
As stated above, the REPC does not permit assignments.  (Rec. 301-297.)
Furthermore, the law is clear that assignments cannot be made where, as here, there is a
material alteration in the risk imposed upon LD III: "A party can assign its contractual rights
to a third party unless: (a) the substitution of a right of the assignor would materially change
the duty of the obligor, or materially increase the burden or risk imposed on him by his
contract, or materially impair his chance of obtaining return performance, or materially
reduce its value to him."  Restatement 2nd of Contracts, Section, 317(2) (1981).  
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B. The Counteroffer Creates Unfavorable Tax Implications.
The Counteroffer materially increased the burden or risk to LD III by implicating LD
III and Ms. Mower in Davis' income tax evasion scheme.  Pursuant to the REPC, LD III was
required to convey the real property and water rights to Davis.  Then if Davis wanted to re-
sell the real property and water rights for a taxable gain, he could sell to whomever he
wanted.  The transfer and closing would be reported to the IRS, and the taxes owing on any
gain to Davis from re-selling the real property and water rights would be due and owing by
Davis.  However, Davis' Counteroffer required LD III to transfer the real property and water
rights directly to five buyers who were not parties to the REPC.  Davis' Counteroffer would
avoid the disclosure to the IRS of the sale to Davis and his resale of the real property and
water rights to others. 
LD III rejected Davis' scheme.  The terms contained in the Counteroffer were never
discussed, never agreed to, and constitute a fundamentally different transaction than the one
which was originally contemplated.  The Counteroffer constitutes a new and different offer.
LD III rejected the offer and there is no agreement remaining to be enforced.
Under the tax laws, Davis should realize a taxable gain from the purchase and re-sale
of the real property and water rights.  That gain would be taxable ordinary income at
applicable rates.  The way the Counteroffer is structured, Davis' gain is hidden in the
concealed re-sale, because the buyers from Davis receive title directly from LD III.  
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Under the REPC, Davis was to purchase the real property and water rights from LD
III.  All the real property and water rights would be sold directly to Davis in a single, simple
transaction.  Davis would be free to re-sell the real property and water rights, but any gain
he realized on such an immediate re-sale would be taxable as ordinary income to him.  Davis'
scheme evades recognition of $300,000 taxable income from Davis' "re-sale" to the five
purchasers.  In contrast, the original REPC would require Davis to re-sell the real property
and water rights to his buyers in a separately documented transactions, generating taxable
income.  In Davis' scheme, transfers would be made to five separate purchasers creating a
conspiracy to evade payment of income taxes.  Davis' scheme unreasonably implicates LD
III and Ms. Mower in this conspiracy.  
Davis completely fails to allocate value as is required by Section 1012 of the Internal
Revenue Code.  26 U.S.C. §1012.  This creates a new and different agreement than what was
originally contemplated.  This constitutes a counteroffer and therefore rejection of even the
conceptual idea discussed between the parties. 
 Davis' scheme is a sham transaction.  The IRS requires the substance of the
transaction to be reported.  Here, the Counteroffer hid the resale, the taxable gain, and
wrongly created a superficial basis for evading payment of taxes.  This is something LD III
refused.  The proposed settlement documents deviate to such a degree from the originally
discussed agreement, that they constitute a counteroffer, which has been duly rejected. 
 The Supreme Court put it best, stating:   
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The incident of taxation depends upon the substance of the transaction...[T]he
transaction must be viewed as a whole, and each step, from the commencement
of negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is relevant...To permit the true
nature of a transaction to be disguised by mere formalisms, which exist solely
to alter tax liability, would seriously impair the effective administration of tax
policies of Congress. 
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co.,324 U.S. 331, 334 (1945).  Further, the government is
"not bound to recognize as the substance or character of a transaction a technically elegant
arrangement which a lawyer's ingenuity has devised."  Griffiths v. Commissioner, 308 U.S.
355, 357-58 (1939).  As such, taxes cannot be escaped "by anticipatory arrangements and
contracts however skilfully [sic] devised … by which the fruits are attributed to a different
tree from that on which they grew."  Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930).
For Ms. Mower, the sole member of LD III, to participate in Davis' scheme puts her
in peril of violating her parole, and being prosecuted.  She could not accept the Counteroffer.
She never would have considered it had it been disclosed to her before it was written up.
Once she learned of the terms for this new offer she could not allow herself to be implicated
in any way with this illegal scheme.  Therefore she rejected the offer.  The District Court's
finding of an enforceable settlement agreement is therefore in error and should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Pursuant to the foregoing arguments and law, Appellant respectfully requests this
Court reverse the error made by the Fourth District Court in this matter and find that there
is no binding settlement agreement between the parties.  This very real concern is not based
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on financial considerations.  Rather, it is an essential result for Ms. Mower to show her
refusal to involve herself in any kind of tax evasion scheme.
DATED this _______ day of March, 2009.
NELSON, SNUFFER, DAHLE & POULSEN
____________________________________
Denver C. Snuffer, Jr.
Steven R. Paul
Daniel B. Garriott
Attorneys for Appellant
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